

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 18863

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CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PEPR PBOR EG IS US
SUBJECT: KAMEL'S CONCERNS ABOUT CAMP DAVID MEETING

SUMMARY: KAMEL REITERATED HIS WORRIES ABOUT UPCOMING CAMP DAVID SUMMIT. HIS PRINCIPAL CONCERN IS THAT SADAT COULD GET HIMSELF INTO SITUATION WHERE HE AGREES TO MORE THAN MINOR WEST BANK RECTIFICATIONS AND SUBSEQUENTLY FINDS THAT HE MUST A WEEK OR TWO LATER RENEGE BY PUBLICLY CLAIMING A DIFFERENT UNDERSTANDING OF CAMP DAVID OUTCOME. KAMEL SAID ANY SUCH DEVELOPMENT WILL DAMAGE SADAT'S POSITION IN THE U.S. AND WILL INEVITABLY DO HARM TO U.S./EGYPTIAN RELATIONS. I SOUGHT REASSURE KAMEL, BUT POINTED OUT THAT WE MUST TAKE SADAT AT HIS WORD. IT WAS REALLY A MATTER FOR SADAT'S ADVISERS TO TRY TO MAKE SURE THAT THE PRESIDENT FULLY UNDERSTANDS ALL OF THE PITFALLS OF WEST BANK NEGOTIATIONS. NOTED ONE OF OUR OBJECTIVES IS TO GET KING HUSSEIN INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS. KAMEL ALSO OUTLINED SOME IDEAS ABOUT HOW CAMP DAVID MEETING MIGHT BE STRUCTURED (PARA 4), MAINLY, HE ADMITTED, SO SADAT'S ADVISERS CAN PROTECT SADAT FROM HIMSELF. BESIDES KAMEL, HASSAN TUHAMI, HASSAN KAMEL AND BOUTROS GHALI WILL PARTICIPATE. THERE IS NO PRESENT INTENTION FOR GAMASY TO DO SO. THERE WILL

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ALSO BE STAFF PERSONNEL. END SUMMARY.

1. HAD LONG TALK WITH FONMIN KAMEL TODAY DURING WHICH, AMONG OTHER THINGS, HE REPEATED HIS WORRIES ABOUT UPCOMING CAMP DAVID SUMMIT. HIS PRINCIPAL WORRY CONTINUES TO BE THAT SADAT WILL BE PERSUADED BY PRESIDENT CARTER TO COMMIT HIMSELF TO A TERRITORIAL RECTIFICATION IN THE WEST BANK THAT GOES BEYOND ANY DEFINITION OF "MINOR".

ANY SUCH CONCESSION WILL BE REJECTED BY HUSSEIN, THE PALESTINIANS, THE SAUDIS AND OTHER ARABS AND, IF AGREED TO BY SADAT, WILL BE DANGEROUS TO SADAT, THE U.S. AND EVEN TO ISRAEL.

2. KAMEL FEARS THAT SADAT COULD GET HIMSELF INTO A SITUATION WHERE HE AGREES TO SOMETHING AT CAMP DAVID AND SUBSEQUENTLY FINDS ON FURTHER REFLECTION AND IN THE LIGHT OF NEGATIVE EGYPTIAN AND ARAB REACTION THAT HE MUST A WEEK OR TWO LATER RENEGE BY PUBLICLY CLAIMING DIFFERENT UNDERSTANDING OF CAMP DAVID OUTCOME. SUCH A SITUATION, KAMEL NOTED, WOULD BE HARMFUL TO SADAT'S IMAGE IN THE UNITED STATES AND WOULD INEVITABLY IMPAIR U.S./EGYPTIAN RELATIONS. HE VOICED EARNEST HOPE THAT PRESIDENT CARTER WILL BE AWARE OF SADAT'S LIMITATIONS IN NEGOTIATING WEST BANK MATTERS AND OF SADAT'S VULNERABILITY TO CRITICISM EVEN FROM FRIENDLY, MODERATE ARAB STATES IF HE GOES BEYOND HIS LIMITS IN NEGOTIATING WEST BANK MATTERS. SADAT, KAMEL REPEATEDLY STATED, MUST SOMETIMES BE PROTECTED FROM HIMSELF.

3. I SOUGHT TO REASSURE KAMEL. I TOLD HIM THAT HE COULD BE SURE THAT PRESIDENT CARTER, THE SECRETARY AND EVERYONE ELSE APPRECIATES THAT SADAT DOES HAVE LIMITATIONS IN DISCUSSING WEST BANK MATTERS. THERE IS NO DESIRE WHATSOEVER TO PUT THE PRESIDENT INTO A POSITION WHERE HE IS
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SUBJECT TO SAUDI, JORDANIAN AND OTHER ARAB CRITICISM. BUT KAMEL SHOULD ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT WHEN SADAT SAYS HE CAN DO SOMETHING, IT IS DIFFICULT FOR PRESIDENT CARTER, THE SECRETARY OR ANYONE ELSE ON OUR SIDE TO QUESTION SUCH A STATEMENT. WE MUST TAKE SADAT AT HIS WORD. I THOUGHT IT WAS REALLY A MATTER FOR SADAT'S ADVISERS TO TRY TO MAKE SURE THAT THE PRESIDENT FULLY UNDERSTANDS ALL OF THE PITFALLS OF WEST BANK NEGOTIATIONS. IT WILL THEN BE UP TO SADAT TO DECIDE WHAT HE BELIEVES HE CAN OR CANNOT SAY OR COMMIT HIMSELF TO. AS KAMEL KNEW, ONE OF THE OBJECTIVES OF THE CAMP DAVID EXERCISE WILL BE TO TRY TO FIND WAYS TO GET KING HUSSEIN INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS. IF THIS SUCCEEDS, IT SHOULD GO A LONG WAY TO ALLAYING HIS CONCERNS. KAMEL AGREED, BUT NOTED THAT IF SADAT MAKES WEST BANK CONCESSIONS THAT ARE UNACCEPTABLE TO JORDAN AND THE PALESTINIANS, IT WILL HAVE THE OPPOSITE EFFECT. IT WILL KEEP KING HUSSEIN OUT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

4. KAMEL ASKED IF WE HAVE ANY IDEA AS YET ABOUT THE SCENARIO FOR THE CAMP DAVID TALKS. I TOLD HIM THAT THIS IS STILL BEING WORKED OUT, BUT ASKED IF HE HAD ANY THOUGHTS ON THE MATTER. KAMEL EXPRESSED PERSONAL VIEW

THAT THERE MIGHT PERHAPS BE AN INITIAL MEETING OF THE THREE HEADS OF STATE NOT FOR SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS, BUT TO TRY TO SET A TONE OR SPIRIT FOR THE MEETING. THEREAFTER, THERE MIGHT BE A MEETING OR MEETINGS OF THE LARGER DELEGATIONS AT WHICH SUBSTANTIVE QUESTIONS CAN BE DISCUSSED. THIS, HE ADMITTED, WOULD ENABLE SADAT TO HAVE AT HIS SIDE ADVISERS WHO COULD COUNSEL HIM ON SUBSTANTIVE AND DRAFTING MATTERS. AS KAMEL SAW IT, IT

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COULD HELP TO AVOID LANGUAGE WHICH MIGHT LATER HAVE TO BE RENEGED UPON BY SADAT. KAMEL RECOGNIZED THAT THERE WILL DOUBTLESS HAVE TO BE OTHER MEETINGS OF THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT, BUT HE WAS CLEARLY VERY UNEASY ABOUT TOO MANY SUCH MEETINGS. I SAID I WOULD PASS HIS SUGGESTIONS ALONG, BUT THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONFERENCE WILL DOUBTLESS DEPEND UPON HOW THINGS PROGRESS. KAMEL AGREED.

5. KAMEL INDICATED THAT SADAT'S PRESENT THINKING IS TO BRING HASSAN TUHAMI, PRESIDENCY DIRECTOR HASSAN KAMEL, FONMIN KAMEL, AND MINSTATE BOUTROS GHALI ALONG. USAMA AL-BAZ AND AHMED MAHER WILL ALSO BE ALONG IN A SUPPORT CAPACITY. HE THOUGHT THERE WOULD PROBABLY BE OTHERS. AS OF NOW, THERE IS NO INTENTION THAT GAMASY WILL ATTEND. (KAMEL WAS NOT AT ALL HAPPY THAT TUHAMI IS BEING TAKEN ALONG. HE CONSIDERS HIM A BAD INFLUENCE ON SADAT.)

6. COMMENT: KAMEL'S CONCERN THAT SADAT, IN THE "GRAND SEIGNEUR" SPIRIT THAT IS HIS, COULD OVERCOMMIT HIMSELF ON THE WEST BANK AND SUBSEQUENTLY FIND THAT HE HAS TO

RENEGE HAS SOME VALIDITY.

WE WILL BE WELL ADVISED TO BEAR THIS IN MIND AND GUARD
AGAINST PLACING SADAT IN A SITUATION WHERE HE PATENTLY
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OVERCOMMITTS HIMSELF. I RECOGNIZE OUR DIFFICULTY IN MAKING
SUCH A JUDGMENT, BUT THE SENSITIVITIES OF KING HUSSEIN,
SAUDIS AND EVEN THE WEST BANK/GAZA PALESTINIANS SHOULD
ALWAYS BE KEPT IN MIND AS CAMP DAVID DELIBERATIONS PRO-
CEED--AS MUCH FOR OUR SAKE AS FOR SADAT'S. EILTS

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